Abstract. After the classical heritage of both Civil Law and Common Law is characterised, their juristische Weltanschauung as professional deontology is reconstructed in parallel with their respective assumptions in theory formation. As to the nature of legal process, the moment of concealment is identifi ed in both types with the fi nal conclusion reached that humans' individual activity and personal responsibility is hidden in the machinery. Civil Law is defi ned by rules enacted as the sole embodiment of the law, treated conceptually in a linguistico-logical way so as to be suitable to lead to mechanical application within the range of a meta-level dogmatic system. The interplay between logical subsumption and volitional classifi catory subordination is analysed in order to show what legal ascriptivity is and why it ends with the artifi cial construction of legal force. Accordingly, Civil Law ideology is imbued with analogies as if cognition were at stake, in contrast to Common Law openly undertaking fi ction to explain in what manner the judicial deliberation on facts whilst reconstruing the whys and hows of past instances can result in ascertaining what the law has allegedly ever been. The law's understanding-theorised in the former and pragmatised in the latter case-is part of its applying as an ontic component of the very existence of the complex social phenomenon called law.
I. Classical Heritage

1.
The rich legal heritage of the Romans, with its changing internal emphases, assured a basis for the development of two differing traditions during the European Middle Ages and Modern Times. In the course of this formative process, starting in the 16 th and 17 th centuries the approaches to law characteristic of our Continent and of the Anglo-Saxon archipelago were gradually separated as they were strengthened by the failure of attempts to codify the law in England. 
Continental Law
2.
As soon as this separation has been perfected, in continental law nothing remains from the ius except that which has been posited as a lex. In terms of this transformation process, the regola-once serving as a didactic exercise and summation-becomes the sole bearer of any legal quality as a set of linguistic signs that is destined to embody the law.
From that time on, anyone who is eager to know what the law is (in terms of its sense, message or signifi cance) must turn to its embodiment in and by rules.
3.
By this act and starting from the Roman imperial epoch, such a form becomes the exclusive source of any contents hidden in and by it. Of course, this form may easily prove to be casual, random and/or fallible; nevertheless, nothing else can be taken as law other than precisely that which has been edicted. This form is no longer an external gown veiling the legislator's idea but the sole embodiment. With such a solution principally strengthened (but still as a correction mechanism building around the original idea), it will be accepted only later that whatever interpretation of the law's provisions may nevertheless draw from the law-maker's intent-as an auxiliary source (that is, among other additional sources)-anything that can be read from (a) the conditions understood by the legislator, (b) the whole texture of regulation, (c) the actual knowledge as to the historical circumstances of legislation or (d) the intentions expressed during the bureaucratic procedure of legislation.
4.
Law is, therefore, a text with a meaning that can be ascertained through textual analysis, that is, by the help of linguistic and logical devices used to look for connections and their disclosure. As interpretation theories would also formulate it, in case of necessity the interpreter might also have recourse to a search for proper meaning through the law's context as drawn from either (a) the intent of the legislator or (b) the historical conditions or (c) the systematic setting of the given piece of legislation.
5.
The very fact that the law is embodied by enacted texts and, therefore, it is treated textually in practice makes it possible for jurisprudential interpretation to forge concepts out of mere words used in the legal texture, in the course of classifi cations. It is no longer simple words but conceptualisations that stand for-as a representation of-diverse aspects of reality, conceptualisations that are developed into a complex and hierarchically organised notional system, which is defi ned in its components' mutual relations by boundaries with edged contours. These concepts are positioned as loci of a taxonomic systemicity, erected in place of mere words.
6. Such conceptuality is, however, not imbued directly by the law's texture itself; the words used in the gesetztes Recht do not simply contain it. For legis latio is a practical act throughout. It is the volitional product of the agent authorised to issue normative texts. This is the mere result of some volitio: contingent in principle, plainly arbitrary in a philosophical sense, since, optionally, it could be something else as well.
7.
What pulls law as such to the conceptual world is the jurisprudents' conceptual analysis: classifi cation and system-building, through which the jurisprudential reasoning over the internal connections of the law-stuff will create concepts by drawing analogies amongst individual words or by breaking down and/or splitting already established concepts into others. As an obvious denominational analogy-supported by the memory of the strict conceptuality disassembled from Biblical texts-this is what we call Rechtsdogmatik. Such a doctrine is the production of legal scholars having analysed law texts with the intent of forging an internal systemic connection in view of reaching this availably perfect conceptual systemic network from that resource of processing. Once established-and only provided that such a demand for conceptual systemic building is grounded on the common ethos of the given legal profession (not as an unnoticed pioneering attempt but expressing the mainstream of the age as, for instance, in Leibniz' epoch)-, such a doctrinal net (with the actual shape it has acquired) will form a web of understanding around the law, i.e. a weakly (though informal) normative environment that already serves as a kind of pre-understanding [Vorverständnis] for all kinds of juristic activity when those professionals (making, applying or just studying law) start dealing with normative or other legal texts.
Accordingly, and as a point of principle, legal texts themselves have ever been and will remain incidental and fallible. Their human understanding in this very culture (with the law already taken at a conceptual meta-level) will become imbued with such a doctrinal knowledge, slowly to be entirely presupposed by it.
(This is why in such cultures law, legal practice and their doctrinal representation may stand as relatively separate but mutually preconditioned and interactive entities, albeit in the social division of labour specialists are accustomed to cultivate one or the other as their specifi c fi elds.) 8. As soon as the legal text is seen as ordered by conceptual limitations and additional adjustments (e.g. by making exceptions through further internal splitting)-with any element or partial fi eld treated as the product of the breakdown of the overall total regulation, considered (in given time segments) as a closed unit, logically coherent and settled in details-well, then whatever idea we can form about law will from the outset be marked by a systemic place or locus, the basic features and defi nitions of which will already derive from its systemic defi nition.
9.
As a pattern of thought, thereby, the mos geometricus is given a shape. This is a concept deriving from the movement characteristic of the 16 th century, when the European continental manner of studying law was set for centuries, that is, a methodological ideal that laid the constant foundation of our approach to law, prevalent even now. Beginning from classical times in Bologna, this idea permeated the reception of Roman law all over Latinic and Germanic Europe; despite all kinds of shaking, rectifi cation, challenge and enrichment with new trends, this is the model that grants commonality in our respective understanding of law, while defi ning our identity and membership in one defi nite legal culture.
Within this intellectuality, the cultivation of law is seen in the composition of a series of operations similar to those in mathematics, upon the basis of which the ideal has ever been to build up a perfect system both closed and exclusive, which, if challenged, can only be replaced by another, completely new in principle, according to EUCLID's axiomatism.
10.
The ideal of law represented by such an idea of normative systemicity will at the same time produce its pair and completion refl ected in the world of factual reality, referenced in and by the law. This is the Tatbestand-taken as the aggregate of those facts that constitute a case in law-, which can only be thought of within the frame of a doctrinally organised approach to law (as a representation of Sein in counterpart to Sollen, with the former featuring the marks qualifi ed by the latter). The notion of Tatbestand is a product of the mid-19 th century continental culture, of the idea that legal scholarship reduced to Begriffsjurisprudenz [conceptual jurisprudence]-while approaching law-related (lawreferenced) factual reality in a conceptual way-can be developed. It is not by chance that the term Tatbestand has no proper equivalent in English, where-without any polarisation between Rechtssetzung [law-making] and Rechtsanwendung [law-applying] , administration of justice is practiced (instead of the law's 'application') 2 -it can only be circumscribed (as translated from Max Weber, for instance) by "operative facts", "actual circumstances" or "facts that constitute a case in law".
11.
Well, according to its theoretical model, law-application projects the world of norms onto that of facts, ascribing the former's normative requirements to the latter. Or, what is modelled here is the set of reality aspects of those actual events, actions and situations that, matched separately one by one, will in their entirety add to defi ne a particular Tatbestand, taken as a case of the rule, representing those reality aspects defi ned through the abstract formulations of a rule, to which the rule ascribes some legal conclusion (or sanction).
12.
This model is based on logical inclusion. What is at stake here is a particular actualisation on the plane of individuality, of what the norm has defi ned on the plane of generality. Starting from the norm, this will ground the logical necessity of judicial syllogism [subsumptio] that will lead to the judgment, based on the given norm, concluded from its generality. (For instance, providing the norm sanctions humans killing humans, and our case is about homicide, then the sanction imputed to anyone having performed the deed must be meted out.) 3 2. Anglo-Saxon Law 13. The Anglo-Saxon mentality has adapted quite a differing pattern of legal regulation and judicial settlement of confl icts from the same Roman legacy. It continued its patterner's earlier attempts towards methodicalness, not departing too much further from the ancient Jewish and Islamic traditions.
It did not look for safety in either conceptualising generalisation or the systemicity it had achieved; it did not dedicate its exclusive trust to the force of central edicts, believed to be suitable to settle everything. It was satisfi ed to build up law through examples following other examples, progressing casually by concrete situations answered by justices, who drew their pattern from their comparisons with earlier patterns, with the fi nal outcome being that the judges themselves, proceeding in individual cases, could became the agents to declare what the legal tradition (refl ected in their case) had always been. In order to master the very process of such a continual actualisation of the law, discipline and rational safety had to be assured to the extent feasible. This way, the Anglo-Saxon law's casual and inductive processing and its respect for the unique in the genuine representation of the fullness of life (and, thereby, also its openness towards any novelty in a given situation) could preserve a bit of sensitivity toward practical reason and daily moral deliberations, notwithstanding the fact that it could also successfully separate itself from the heterogeneity of everyday life through the artifi cial reason it erected. On the one hand, in the case of adjudication it alleges it has based its judgment on unstated rules but, on the other, it refrains from declaring what regolas have indeed been serving it. In consequence, almost until today it has not cultivated the kind of doctrinal culture that may build on general abstract norms exclusively.
The Anglo-Saxon law cannot be taken as thoroughly conceptualised into an overall taxonomic system, independent of whether an enormous amount of rationalising literature has for centuries edifi ed rather considerable meta-intellectuality above it. Instead of employing conceptual systemic consistency and completeness to build a replacement of the given chaotic accumulation, this literature responds mostly to practical challenges in terms of functionality and practicality. 
II. Reality in our Approach to Law
14. The question arises whether or not our view formed on law in Civil Law cultures comports with institutional reality. The answer can only be ambivalent, that is, duplicate as formulated at different levels.
As Professional Deontology
15.
Our previous characterisation is true in a descriptive sense in so far as it gives an account of the ideal pattern of our legal thought. For ideology as a kind of professional deontology, a manner of thinking specifi c to the legal profession, and in this sense a juristische Weltanschauung, has been and continues to be undoubtedly present in the approach to law rooted in our continental culture. In the above sense as well, ideology is consciousness that exerts impacts onto practice; consequently, it is a decisive component of the social ontological description of humans in action. This is part of a culture that assigns frames, within the boundaries of which we appropriate the world intellectually. Within them, we form key categories for understanding the world, while we also sense and/or attribute defi nite value-contexts of/to the same world. In its turn, juristische Weltanschauung is the foundation stone of legal cultures that shapes human abilities (skills and sensitivities) by which we may sense law at all and search for paths and spheres of action with reference to it. As a consequence, independent of its epistemological status (namely, of the issue of whether or not our specifi c law does indeed function this way, under its conditions and fulfi lling its criteria), the lawyers' professional deontology is part of the genuine ontology of legal arrangements. Accordingly, it is part of the operation we can describe starting from the accumulated experience of (a) human practice making use of law, (b) the overall societal praxis and (c) jurisprudentia as the total sum of legal praxis. 
In its Theoretical Explanation
16.
At the same time, theoretical reconstruction raises reasonable questions as to what indeed the existence of law does consist of, what are the consequences of its being carried by a linguistic medium, what are the chances of humans as socially exclusive acting agents and, at last but not least, in what exactly does their responsibility lie? Therefore, the inquiry goes on further: are we perhaps ourselves passive observers (perhaps mere reference points) in a structure operating like clockwork (possibly without our personal presence as well), since the law works as thoroughly logifi ed within its pure formalism in a quasi-automatic way, broken down into a homogenised network that is empowered to produce its output, and which can reproduce itself continually-on the basis of its own presuppositions as equipped with its own laws and consequences, built in by some next-to-mechanical safety? ' World Concept. Budapest, 1985, 193. The answer can only be formulated in terms of the suitability of human practice for selfreproduction through its own traditions as characterised by today's social theories, on the one hand, and of the irrevocable human responsibility as cultivated by the known theologies of morals, on the other.
17.
Well, the ideological stand implied by our juristische Weltanschauung approaches both language and law as if they were simple objects of the world's reality; as if it was going to suggest exactly what metaphysically inspired logic wanted to inspire actual belief in (particularly in Germanic philosophies 6 )-namely, that relations (of logic and dialectic especially) are hidden in, or implied by, things and objects (their moves, coincidences or confi gurations) themselves. Nonetheless, it is exclusively statements that we can make as to objects and as to whatever kind of virtuality, that is, practically as to anything that can be specifi ed by human ingenuity in the course of our mental appropriation of any imaginable world (involving the Golden Fleece or a unicorn, or hypothesising such limiting units of reference as the absolute cold or the arithmetic zero point, or abstracting the philosophical conclusion of "Das Nicht nichtet", as developed by Martin Heidegger 7 ). If and insofar as we treat such statements within one single coherently comprehensive perspective, then once the truth/falsity of any of them, grounding our argumentation, is acknowledged, we may deduce true/false conclusions from them.
18.
At the same time, law is thoroughly disantropomorphised, and it is we who have done this. By abstracting from our subject's substance and genuine nature (dependent directly on human volition, practice, consideration or pure interest), we are used to investing our trust (which we have not undertaken, because it is not relegated to our rational common sense) in something else-notably, in some virtually reifi ed entity or safety, projected from ourselves into a kind of substitute authority. Accordingly, we began to treat law as a reifi ed construction alienated from ourselves, as if it could operate without us, like the Delphi oracle or a God-judgment set in motion as a specifi c slot-machine to settle our case, into which (as we are made to believe under the constraints of our professional socialisation) we might feed the parameters of the given case so that it would then dispense from its "black box" the single conclusive decision.
19.
As to the device of our communication, we have to be aware of the fact that law as linguistic practice also can only be intelligible for those who are skilled enough to use it properly. The case is by no means one of mute signs that catch or address us. It is we who make the language sounded in sending and receiving signs as markers. Of course, we do not act as isolated Robinsons. We are equipped with general societal (and added professional) education, socialisation and practice of common understanding. This is strengthened by daily use, suitable to re-conventionalise language practice. Thereby, we actualise the language that may make both our procedures and life in society liveable and reasonable.
20.
Language is certainly not exact, on the one hand. This continues to be so notwithstanding the fact that, as the most available mediator in societal contact and commerce, only such an ambivalent medium can fulfi l language's ontological role, on the other hand. Moreover, not even in principle could language be reduced into a less unambiguous mediator or conveyor of meanings. At the most, we may try to be more precise in our handling and resolution (dedicated to given relationships or limiting issues, when we draw limits or weigh individual situations), by asserting in a socially valid way what we want to express then and there. When we proceed by defi ning an actualised meaning (instead of the physical act or linguistic symbolism pointing directly at what we actually mean), a step forward is taken indeed, but without ameliorating the language itself, its state of being fuzzy from the beginning. Our innovation or rectifi cation generated at one moment will inevitably become like mist when problematising at another moment and this goes on infi nitely. For the next moment we have language as it has ever been: silent-and defective in counselling. This is to say that the next moment is faced with a new situation, with novel expectations toward language, or mediation through language.
21.
That which may catch and bind us in fact is neither language nor law expressed lingually, but our conventionality. In societal cooperation we do rely on law, among other things. We call upon it, refer to and interpret it, trying to settle affairs according to patterns it has forwarded. For law offers orientation in settling disputable practical issues. It offers guidance and proposes a normative model. It serves us by being wedged amongst us, separating the partners in dispute, by being independent of each of us and disposing of relative consistency. For it is suitable for mediation by offering a pattern to our action. That is, it can model dispute resolution so that the outcome will be not of mine or yours but that foreseen with respect to all such (essentially or substantially similar) situations, cognoscible by anyone in advance. So, what will be concluded will have already been patterned.
22.
It is facts that surround us in nature and social life. These are mostly facts simple and unmediated, "brute" and formless. What we are faced with in the law's Tatbestand are already institutional facts. For law is not to be found in our affairs themselves. We identify it mostly outside of and above, and subsequent to, the elementary formative components of our affairs, at a time when we, reinterpreting them in the law's normative context, try to project the law's structured messages onto a factual or hypothetic case. Life is going on incessantly, following heterogeneous tracks. And the law is-allegorically speakingwithdrawn like a spider, expecting now and then to strike at any of its selected aspects. Once that happens, the law will assimilate this whole life event (by denaturing the latter's heterogeneous full complexity) to the former's homogenised-simplifi ed-norming [Normierung] . Literally expressed, no one can any longer identify what the law has made out of it, and perhaps not those who are targeted by it; since one given Tatbestand (predefi ned by the law) will have been distilled from its primitively unique full-of-life richness. And this is so because the Tatbestand cannot be anything other than the factual refl ection of the corresponding normative ruling. The only features that can be included as imputed to the humans in question (to their casual drama or luck, taken as a personal, non-recurrently individual event) are those who have already been specifi ed as relevant in the abstract regulation.
23.
All this is as if artifi cially erected nightmarish shades were looking for opportunities, with projective nets, in the density of life, with the aim of picking suitable relevance-sets from it. That is, an external logic is projected upon acts in life, according to different available considerations-for instance, to impute to a fl ighty irascibility (attributed, e.g. to O. J. Simpson 8 ) homicide, adultery, personal injury, perhaps breach of contract, or even failure to meet his obligations for maintenance, out of the caldron of the legal witches' kitchen. This is to say that as long as we have not decided at all what of this or that qualifi es as having occurred according to the law, we may only ponder in silence. However, as soon as that is decided, we start banging on every gate: this is that, and only that, moreover, a master case of that-as if that had been invented from the beginning and only to sanction our client's case.
Our game could appear to be funny as well if it were not both serious and indispensable. This structured and more-or-less homogenised thought is applied in all fi elds of socialisation and societal transmission, that is, within the bounds of our humanly created second nature. As a consequence, life itself will be arranged following such a logic, destitute of the values and intimacy of the heterogeneity of everyday life but equipped with the force of social ordering and engineering, and, therefore, desired as the sine qua non of civilised human existence. For the sake of generating law and order for ourselves, we raise fi xed points that are extrapolated and alienated from ourselves as the standards addressing us.
24.
I may happen to carry only a potato to you. However, I cannot know in advance whether and when my or your lawyer will call it delivery, agency or necessity, supply or disturbance of possession, perhaps theft, or something else. In any case, the internal (primitive) logic of my action (with its process-like development and gradualness) may well differ considerably from that which will be ascribed to me in law. This is so because the action in question may have followed its own path alongside its ad hoc "logic" (chaotic in itself as having been formed from one moment to the next), with open alternatives in every movement forward here and there. And all this notwithstanding, the juridically constructed Tatbestand will reconstruct a cumulative development out of this, as a one-way process that may have pursued one preset end with features that involve nothing more than those facts that may make a case in law. And what is more, the way I shall be judged will be seen as the outcome of cognition, as if I were tracked all the way through by the knowledge of a neutral outsider-instead of treating me as the subject to whom the normative consequence of a system of norms is meted out.
25.
The declared result of normative imputation is ascriptive. It will conclude some normative consequences of my action by the force of someone's volitive act and discretion. The legal status as to which my action is being qualifi ed or classifi ed will be defi ned with the above intention of imposing those consequences, and not as issuing from mere cognition. The whole process is not cognition as a result of someone having (with a magnifi er) searched in the law or examined the collective memory of my action in order to identify exactly what (and how) may have met in the two (normative and factual) components. In fact, my judge has tested variations to couple them-according to additional considerations such as the prevailing interests and, maybe, intuitive sym/anti-pathy towards me. By the very fact of having qualifi ed the event as the case of the given legal category, my case has already been decided. This legal category being an institutional fact itself, it is not cognition but exclusively a volitional classifi cation that will classify my action as a case of the law. In law, nothing is described: we only classify actual life situations here and there. Instead of cognising, we decide-with as much rationally as we can, and based on evidence as much as we can. Therefore, instead of converting the action into anything of logical necessity (that is, into subsumption or a logically obvious conclusion), we subordinate it to something else with the justices' volitional act's force.
26.
Let us pay attention to the change in emphasis here, from the logical model establishing necessary connections amongst our things in an impersonal way, to the social ontological nature of what in fact is stricken out and produced by our social action of foreplanning, since all the connected steps are of such a type here that could have not ensued without their actual performance. Our human involvement is, therefore, creative and strictly constitutive, irreplaceably effectuating something. In other words, it is arbitrary in the sense of logical necessity, even if not otherwise senseless, indefensible or irrational. This is to say that it is mostly practical problem-solving that we are engaged in, whilst the motivation for our verdict-its justifi cation-will prove, from the texture of the law, to be the compelling demand, that is, the necessity (even in details) of such-and only such-a solution.
27. All this takes the form of a decision. For the given solution never could be completed in another way without artifi cially cutting off all the further (and otherwise feasible) paths and ways of the endless series of doubts, including the temptation to consider crossroads with alternative solutions. Until we have manipulated (interpreted and arranged) the facts to an adequate depth, not even their legal classifi cation is fi nalised. Nevertheless, disputing what this was, actually how this happened and what grounds we have for qualifying this as the case of that, can only be cut as a Gordian knot. This is equal to saying that our certainty is by no means absolute; therefore, the certainty concerned will be termed as "judicial" (i.e. artifi cial), "rational" (i.e. limited) and/or "procedural" (i.e. with exclusive validity for the judgment) at most. We should consider how much we are used to ignore, when approaching law-application in a purely juristic manner (breaking it down into a syllogistic form), its fallible and contingent nature only justifi able through the long-term reliability of human praxis in the last resort (which reproduces itself incessantly) in general, and the underlying character of the qualifi cation of facts-for the story itself is to be reconstructed from the witnesses' narrations expressed in different object-languages, which has to be transformed (transcribed) into a fact in the law, that is, "qualifi ed" as the case, or subordinated to be a case, of an abstract defi nition-and of the gaining of judicial certainty-with compiling the story in the course of evidence anyhow: from bare fragments, probability conclusions at different levels that may result mostly from additional circumstances, all them serving as the suffi cient base to declare categorically sometime that that happened in fact-in particular. For all these components with their most elementary constituents are creative with a constructive force, irreducible to formal certainty in a scientifi c sense, and as such, unsuitable to total rational reconstruction; the fact notwithstanding that these are the most substantive moments-serving as the turning points [Eckdaten]-of each and every judgement in justice.
Methodologically speaking, it could only be compared to theology in explanation of the transcendence of human life, which, since the age of Saint Thomas Aquinas, was explicated in masses of volumes of great systemic corpuses, expressed in incessant discussions (in lines of competing directions) for centuries. Behind the whole undertaking, however, it is the humanity's fullness of being-their total existential and practical consideration and decision, their extraordinary complex (psychological and other) attitude-that stands, which, in their fi nite life and personal options, express an act of volition that, beyond a certain limit, cannot be stressed further by the mere means of ratio. This is the moment of credo (specifi ed as the realisation of credo quia absurdum). Such realisation will be socialised by us as a Ding für uns, as something given to us, that we have to develop in our earthly life by the intervention of faith, that is, by recognising our created nature with the whole chain of ensuing conclusions. Once this recognition is achieved as wedged in our socialisation, every 28. This is why adjudication is eventually fi nalised with legal force. Whatever decision is reached, it cannot tempt any longer. It must be fi nally accomplished, placed in the archives' oblivion, as a past instance of accomplishment of the then-prevalent law and order.
29.
Musing on the ordering role of law in society, we may ponder on how many thousands of thousandths of our daily transactions are selected in order to provoke lawsensitive deliberation at all, how many thousandths of them are made controversial in order to await judicial deliberation. A great volume, the overwhelming majority, of both deviances and actions that are hardly defensible in law will remain free from legal reaction. What percentage of the other part will gain fi nal force without any appeal against its fi rst adjudication? Perhaps this will be a majority of the cases whose juridical solution would presumably never reach reconfi rmation in legal reconsideration, while convenience, triviality or other petty conditions may have been in play in promoting their fi rst conclusion with legal force. 
The Complexity of Civil Law Mentality
31.
Within the range of utmost possibilities, the continental legal game builds up lawapplication processes as an analogy of the cognitive ones common to the sciences: fi rm platforms (as indubitable stepping stones), logifi ed steps (inspired by mathematics), strictly methodical interpretation (of rules) and verifi cation (of facts), all concluded to a certainty. Behind such an analogy, the lawyers' ideology assists. It suggests logical force as a necessity with no alternative. As the entire construct is humanly operated, only a role of the police offi cer who directs traffi c at turnouts seems to have been assigned to the lawyer. And behind component of the reconstructions from such theologies (with their mission's vocation) turns at once to be intelligible for us, raising the awareness of its conclusions as well. But when this is missing, in the given fi eld-and in regards of the actor in question-the object itself (together with the complex net of relevancies) will be lost: it will cancel itself out of their well-developed potential. Dartmouth-New York, 1992, 299-330 , is inspired by such recognition. According to it, the state power that controls the course of "law and order" implementation has to tolerate-up to a certain level, grade and depth, having in view the practical considerations of practical operationability-the variety of jurisprudence effected in the name of law (with the competition of divergences involved), as inseparable from the total function. However, as a practical test of the legally relevant qualities of jurisprudence (such as unity, security, justice, and expediency) it will subject a randomly selected part of jurisprudential issues to sample-taking, in order to fi lter their quality. So, historically speaking, this is the origin and the mental root appeal. the scenes nothing but our well-educated professional socialisation stands, requiring that the sole right decision will be reached from all available alternatives, the one which can be identifi ed within the polarity of either truth or falsity.
The Complexity of Common Law Mentality
32.
From a European continental perspective, we are used to considering the Anglo-Saxon approach as freed from ideology, because it abounds in marks of unsophisticated naturalness without artifi cial mediatedness. No consideration is usually given to the fact that even its myth-coloured basic defi nition is formed ideologically from the outset. For, as is well known, that approach generates a judicial declaration of what the law is from the alleged positivity of the immemorial custom of the Realm. Moreover, it is expressedly alienating by tripping the entire justice-game into lawyerly technical subtleties and tricks, in opposition to the logical clarity and transparent foreseeability of the continental Professorenrecht.
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And, last but not least (and unless it creates its own subject of analysis as the result of today's analytics) its demands are strikingly a-theoretical, with no receptivity to conceptual issues.
13
IV. With Humans in the Legal Machinery 33. In turn, "humans are hidden in the machinery" as the law cannot function without an active human component. This is obvious, since there are no "correct" answers in themselves, as no exemplar of them can be found.
14 We may endeavour to reach a rational 12 It is no chance that legal theories of alienation were mainly formulated in the domain of Common Law. Cf., e.g. Conklin, W. Philosophy and General Jurisprudence 3-the doubts expressed on the sense of such a universalising bosh, which is destitute of the lowest theoretical sensitivity in the author's exclusive dealings with American daily topics under the aegis of global legal theorising, stuffed with the want of genuine academic knowledge, as if the author never heard, for instance, of the doctrine on the sources of law, legal institutionalism, or Hans Kelsen's foundational doctrine. Rounding this specimen of intellectual poverty by not even understanding the stake, in his rebutter the author calls its European critics to the respect of liberal tolerance and academic freedom, perhaps for lack of anything better.
14 In theoretical reconstruction, my concern is certainly not the validity of propositions that natural law doctrines (aiming at ontological foundations inspired by theological presuppositions) or practical philosophies (in their rebirth today) may advance in search for connections, but exclusively the specifi c issue of the ways in which prevalent trends (or their comparable analogons) may exert fermentative effect on the daily administration of justice.
justifi cation at the most, and through benevolent discourses in human communities, an optimum solution has to be targeted somehow. We are fallible humans, as fallible as are our endeavours to make the world better. We may try to fi nd salvation exclusively with skills and instruments we have developed, and, of course, through unceasingly adapting and correcting them.
34.
Irrevocably and unavoidably, all that remains is to draw on the recognition that, notwithstanding our different societal roles, somehow we all are parts of the practice of reproducing this understanding with full personal responsibility-whether as citizens, or as educators and socialisers (who form the public understanding professionally as teachers, priests, journalists and other social workers), or as intellectuals or politicians (who shape the former's frameworks), or having been specifi cally initiated as actors in the law's workings.
35.
In the fi nal analysis, our law as actually practiced will hardly be anything other than that which we have formed out of it through our social co-operation and the fi ghts we have undertaken.
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36. In the end, law is a mode of speaking. It is practiced as a specifi c fi eld of communication with a game of open scenes, which is actualised if played by humans through actual referencing. Accordingly-and instead of "what it is?"-"all that notwithstanding: how it can be achieved" will be the fi nal question that serves as a criterion as well.
This also involves a call for axiology, in order to set some standard as a foundational stepping stone. This is to be done even if in the absence of a claim that we have made it suitable to conclude anything from it or subordinate anything to it (as the past antagonistic rivalry between the doctrines of natural law and legal positivism stressed). And this may presume to arrive fi nally at a development from thesis via anti-thesis to syn-thesis related to the correlation among humanity's natural, societal and spiritually founded intellectual world, perhaps strengthened as well by the re-/dis-solution of the law's positivistic selfdefi nition. Thereby, a genuine re-foundation may also be achieved in order to master humanity's response to the global challenges that are at our door.
